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Abstract: Mobile data services in combination with profluent web services are seemingly 
the path breaking domain in current information research. Effectively, these mobile web 
services will pave the way for exciting performance and security challenges, the core need-
to-be-addressed issues. On security front, though a lot of standardized security 
specifications and implementations exist for web services in the wired networks, not much 
has been analysed and standardized in the wireless environments. This paper addresses 
some of the critical challenges in providing security to the mobile web service domain. We 
first explore mobile web services and their key security issues, with special focus on 
provisioning based on a mobile web service provider realized by us. Later we discuss state-
of-the-art security awareness in the wired and wireless web services, and finally address the 
realization of security for the mobile web service provisioning with performance analysis 
results. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As mobile and wireless applications are growing ubiquitous 
in conjunction with the fast developing web services, the 
ability to provide secure and reliable communication in the 
vulnerable and volatile mobile ad-hoc topologies is vastly 
becoming necessary. Unfortunately these pervasive 
networks, where a central administration is not always 
possible; the security implementation is hard and 
challenging. Moreover with the advent of easily readable 
web services, mobile web services, the complexity to realize 
security increased further. Secure provisioning of mobile 
web services needs proper identification mechanism, access 
control, data integrity and confidentiality. It also requires 
policies and trust relations to be established between users 
as well as between users and service providers.  
  Even though a lot of standardized security specifications, 
protocols and implementations like WS-Security [1], SAML 
[2] etc., exist for web services in traditional wired networks, 
not much has been explored and standardized in wireless 
environments, with feasibility, till date.  Some of the 
reasons for this poor state might be the lack of active 
commercial data applications due to the limited resources of 
the mobile terminals like memory, processing capability, 
and the low transmission rates of the wireless mediums. Our 
study contributes to this work and tries to bridge this gap, 
with main focus at realizing some of the existing security 
standards in the mobile web services domain. 
  The paper discusses our project “Mobile Web Service 
Provisioning“, with its security issues, challenges and 
difficulties in inducing the current existing security 
standards. Breaches specific to web services such as 
sniffing, tampering, snooping etc. are considered along with 
general security breaches like man-in-the-middle attacks, 
denial-of-service attacks, and intrusion. The paper is 
organized as follows: 
  In Section 2, we discuss the concept and applications of 
mobile web service provisioning, whereas section 3 
addresses the security challenges in mobile web services. 
Section 4 describes existing and emerging standards in 
mobile and web service domains. Section 5 discusses some 
of the security realization details and their analysis on our 
Mobile Host. Section 6 concludes the paper with possible 
future research directions. 
2 MOBILE WEB SERVICE PROVISIONING 
As high end mobile phones and all-ip broadband based 
mobile networks are fast creeping into the current market, 
the increase in usage of mobile data services by a roaming 
user is quite evident. To that effect, lots of organizations 
have been established, up and running, to accomplish these 
necessities of this large user base in mobile data services 
domain [3]. Although today’s bulk of the end users still 
relay on mobiles only for voice calls, the previous argument 
will augment the usage of other services especially data 
services very soon. The statistic analysis provided by 
Idealliance [4] further enhances the point that very near in 
future; best part of the requirement will end up at a device 
called high-end mobile phone/handset.  
  Web services, on the other hand, are an intriguing prospect 
in the field of current information systems engineering. Web 
services are a distributed component model, based on 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [5], with primary 
motive of achieving loose coupling and cross-platform 
interoperability across applications.  Its big advantage lies in 
its simplicity in expression, communication and servicing. 
The core components of web services architecture are 
Provider, Publisher and Consumer. The Provider develops a 
service and registers it with the Publisher. The public 
interfaces of the service are described using WSDL [6]. A 
prospective Consumer searches for the service at Publisher, 
gets the WSDL, interprets it and invokes the service from 
Provider. To mention, quite a few security mechanisms exist 
for standalone web services. 
   As the mobile data services and web services are 
promising enough, the thought of mobile web services is 
very much on the money within the context. To support the 
mobile web services, there exists many organisations such 
as OMA [7], LA [8] on the specification front; some 
practical data service applications such as OTA (over-the-
air provisioning), application handover etc. on the 
commercial front; and SUN, IBM toolkits [9-10] on the 
development front. Thus, though this is early stages, we can 
safely assume that mobile web services are the road ahead. 
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Figure 1   Basic mobile web services framework with Mobile Host 
In support of the above argument, a small mobile web 
service provider (“Mobile Host”) [11] has been developed 
for resource constrained devices. Figure 1 shows the basic 
mobile web services framework with web services being 
provided from the Mobile Host. The striking point is that 
the service provider was possible on one of the earliest high 
end handset configuration (Sony Ericsson P800). The 
memory imprint was around ~130KB. The detailed 
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performance analysis conducted with the Mobile Host 
showed that the processing capability, time frames are very 
much within the acceptance levels. 
  In a commercial picture, mobile hosting of web services 
can exhibit its potential in various ways. Primarily, the 
cellular phone can act as a multi-user device without 
additional manual effort on part of the mobile carrier. The 
approach finds many of its applications in domains like 
collaborative learning, social systems, mobile community 
support etc. One can also foresee a strong drive towards P2P 
architectures in mobile world. Mobile Host thus creates a 
new trend and lead to manifold opportunities to mobile 
operators, wireless equipment vendors, third-party 
application developers, and end users [12]. 
  So the Mobile Host on a latest available configuration, 
coupled with impressing mobile web services and high 
speed mobile networks, emphasizes high reality and holds a 
very exciting prospect. This very fundamental factor is 
influencing us to further explore this domain. Our current 
research focuses at QoS aspects of the Mobile Host, with 
main concern at security implications of this approach.   
3 SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR MOBILE WEB 
SERVICES 
Once the web service is deployed on the Mobile Host, the 
service is prone to different types of security breaches like 
denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, 
intrusion, spoofing etc. As web services use message-based 
technologies for complex transactions across multiple 
domains, traditional point-to-point security paradigms fall 
short. Potentially, a web-service message traverses through 
several intermediaries before it reaches its final destination. 
Therefore, the need for sophisticated end-to-end message-
level security becomes a high priority and is not addressed 
by existing security technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2   Typical security breaches in mobile web services 
 
Figure 2 depicts some of the typical security breaches in 
web service and wireless environments. Spoofing is a means 
of accessing a system with false identity. Proper 
authentication and authorization principles are to be used to 
cover spoofing and unauthorized access. Tampering is an 
act of unauthorized modification of a web service message 
in network. Network eavesdropping is to monitor traffic for 
sensitive data such as plaintext passwords by placing 
sniffers in the middle of the network. Proper encryption and 
digital signatures can help in avoiding tampering and 
network eavesdropping attacks.  
  Generally WSDL files reveal lot of information about a 
web service and other sensitive information like 
configuration data of servers. Use authorized access for 
WSDL downloads to avoid this disclosure. Replaying a 
valid changed or unchanged message to a web service by 
impersonating the client is referred as replay attack. The 
unchanged message replay attack, basic replay attack, can 
be avoided by using nonce, a cryptographically unique 
value, with the web service message. Denial-of-service is a 
process of making a system, server or application 
unavailable. For each individual service, maintaining and 
understanding the collection of data can help in protecting it 
from denial-of-service attacks. But having such a scenario 
implemented on the resource constrained mobile phones 
could be impractical. Security policies and high-level access 
control should help to a certain extent in this regard. 
  At a minimum, the web service communication should 
support the basic security requirements as emphasized in 
figure 3. Secure message transmission is achieved by 
ensuring confidentiality and data integrity, while 
authentication and authorization will ensure that the service 
is accessed only by the trusted service requestors.  
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Figure 3   Basic security requirements for mobile web services 
4 EXISTING/EMERGING STANDARDS 
Before considering the realization of security challenges for 
the mobile web services domain, this section discusses 
briefly the existing security standards, specifications and 
some relevant notable projects in web services and wireless 
domains. Listed below are some of the standard committees 
and organizations working around web services, wireless 
domain and their security: 
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• W3C [13] is primarily responsible for SOAP [14], 
XML Encryption [15], XML Signature [16] and WSDL 
ndard
web service specific standards and it owns 
mary 
ork for interoperable federated identity.  
ices.
SOAP protocol, which in turn exchanges 
-Security and specifies the language to 
obile data services to achieve 
above and 
er-to-server 
Server-to-mobile terminal 
eer-to-peer) 
5 SECURITY REALIZATION AND ANALYSIS 
sta s. 
• OASIS [17] is an organization which has larger 
interest in 
pri areas of our interest such as WS-Security and 
SAML standards. 
• Liberty Alliance (LA) group was aimed at 
providing a framew
• Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) was formed to 
develop and promote interoperability for mobile data 
serv    
  The web service communication is now-a-days mostly 
based on 
information in XML format. Traditional SOAP protocol 
from W3C does not exactly provide ways for secure 
communication. Mainly OASIS standards with the help of 
XML standards like XML Signature and XML Encryption 
provides cryptographic protection, and thus help in securing 
a web service message.  The WS-Security specification 
from OASIS is the core element in web service security 
realm. It provides ways to add security headers to SOAP 
envelopes, attach security tokens and credentials to a 
message, insert a timestamp, sign the messages, and encrypt 
the message. 
  Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an 
extension of WS
exchange identity, attribute and authorization information 
between various parties involved in web service 
communication in an interoperable way. This SAML in 
combination with LA specification framework could help in 
achieving Single-sign-on. The basic components of LA 
framework are Principal, Service provider and Identity 
provider. LA framework’s primary provisions are 
Federation, Single-sign-on and Circle-of-Trust. Federation 
establishes relationship between any two of the basic LA 
components. Single-sign-on is a mechanism where the 
authentication, provided to Principal by the Identity 
Provider, can be maintained to multiple Service Providers. 
Circle-of-Trust establishes trust between Service Providers 
and Identity Providers with agreements upon which 
Principals can make transactions and exchange information 
in a seamless and secure way. 
  In addition, OMA group is concentrating to have a unique 
specification/framework for m
interoperability. OMA was formed in June 2002 by nearly 
200 companies including the world’s leading mobile 
operators, device and network suppliers, information 
technology companies and content and service providers. 
Mobility and roaming are the obvious key characteristics 
which are hindrances to mobile web service interactions. 
The current possible mobile web service applications have a 
number of drawbacks as following. First, the applications 
should be created through tightly-coupled, costly and close 
alliances between value-added service providers. Second, 
they have to be created based on a mixture of mostly 
propriety models and disparate standards such as WAP, 
Location, Presence, Identity etc. Furthermore, most of the 
standards to develop these applications have been devised 
specifically for the mobile environment from the ground up. 
All these drawbacks will draw high complexity to deploy, 
integrate and use these applications and services. 
  The OMA Web Services Enabler specification [18] is 
destined to cover all the drawbacks mentioned 
envisioned to support the following mobile web service 
interactions: 
 
• Serv
• 
• Mobile terminal-to-server 
• Mobile terminal-to-mobile terminal (p
As discussed earlier, secure provisioning of m obile web 
services needs proper message-level security consisting data 
chitecture to realize the basic security 
le Host. 
O
c
plementation Model 
S-Security for Mobile Host 
J2ME MIDP2.0 [19] for 
integrity, confidentiality and end-point access security that 
constitutes authentication, access control. Since, there exists 
no approved specific mobile web service standards and lot 
of propriety interfaces are involved, the security was 
analyzed on a case-by-case scenario.  
5.1 Design Model 
Figure 4 depicts our ar
principles for the Mobi
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Figure 4   Proposed security realization scenario of Mobile Host 
nce a web service is deployed on Mobile Host; any WS 
lient can request for the service. The SOAP message along 
with the WS-Security information is routed across the 
internet to the Mobile Host. The message-level security 
information is extracted and addressed at the Mobile Host 
while the end-point access security is handled by a third 
party on behalf of the Mobile Host. Then the corresponding 
service details are extracted and the service is invoked. The 
SOAP response is sent back to the client across the same 
route. 
5.2 Im
As far as the realization of the W
is concerned, we have used 
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implementation on a Sony Ericsson P910i. The device 
supports MIDP2.0 with CLDC1.0 [20] configuration. For 
cryptographic algorithms and digital signers, java based 
light weight cryptographic API from Bouncy Castle crypto 
package [21] is used. KSoap2 [22], the java API based on 
KXml2 [23], is adapted by us according to WS-Security 
standard and utilized to create the request/response web 
service messages.  
Figure 5   Web Service handler of the Mobile Host 
The we obile 
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ted 
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ided at the 
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ted message (Treqs), the  
Figure 6   Secured mobile web service invocation: operations and 
time stamps 
b service security enabled WS Handler of the M
 shown in figure 5. The SOAP Processor extrac
SOAP messages from web service requests. The Security 
Handler does the respective security tasks/checks over the 
message and transfers decrypted message to the service 
handler, which extracts the service details and invokes the 
respective service.  Effectively, the handler manages the full 
message-level security and assists in end-point security. 
  To realize confidentiality, the message was ciphered with 
symmetric encryption algorithm and the genera
symmetric key is exchanged by means of asymmetric 
encryption method. The message was tested against various 
symmetric encryption algorithms including the WS-Security 
mandatory algorithms, namely, TRIPLEDES [24], AES-
128, AES-192 and AES-256 [25]. The PKI algorithm used 
for key exchange was RSA-V1.5 [26] with 1024 and 2048 
bit keys. Upon successful deployment and testing of 
confidentiality, we considered data integrity on top of 
confidentiality. The messages were digitally signed and 
tested against two signer algorithms, namely, 
DSAwithSHA1 (DSS) [27] and RSAwithSHA1 signature 
algorithms. Note that, as said earlier, all the algorithms 
mentioned above have been implemented using java based 
light weight bouncy castle cryptographic API.  
Mobile Host stored the authentication details at the smart 
phone itself. This posed further problems with th
constraints of the smart phone, as the authentication 
information needed extra resources. An alternative for this 
scenario is provided, where the Mobile Host generates an 
authentication request to a standalone web service on behalf 
of the client.  The client can then access any service 
provided by the Mobile Host. Both the authorization-service 
request and the service request must be generated in a single 
session. An alternative for the authentication would be the 
Single-sign-on addressed by SAML and LA.  
  In the user-intervened authorization, each of the services 
provided at the Mobile Host can be configured to obtain the 
providers (person using the Mobile Host) acceptance before 
providing the respective service to the WS requestor. 
Critical issues like disapprovals, user being busy and 
timeouts were also considered. The process was also 
automated by using an access control mechanism, based on 
the authentication details. Realization of Single-sign-on, 
where identity and credentials can be maintained for 
multiple sessions and parties, is currently under study and 
our future publications will address this issue. 
  As far as end-point security scenario is con
basic service-level authentication and user
authorization were realized. In the service-le
authentication, an authentication service is prov
mobile web service provider which accepts a usernam
password and validates the client. Authenticatio
password based, Public Key Infrastructure (P
certificate based.  We have considered passwo
5.3 Performance Model 
To analyze the performance of the Mobile Host with the 
security load, the durations of different activities during the 
web service invocation cycle are observed. The client 
initiates the call for the web service and the Mobile Host 
processes the request, populates the response, and sends 
response back to the client. The total time taken for this 
mobile web service invocation (Tmwsp) constitutes, the time 
taken by client for constructing valid SOAP message (Tcc), 
the time taken to encrypt the message w
time taken to serialize the encryp
WS request transmission
-
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time taken to transmit the SOAP request to Mobile Host 
(Treqt), the time taken for de-serializing the XML based 
SOAP request message (Treqd), the time taken to decrypt the 
request message (Treqdc), the time taken by the Mobile Host 
to execute the respective business logic and to populate the 
response (Tprocess), the time taken to encrypt the response 
message with security information (Tresec), the time taken for 
serializing the encrypted response message back to XML 
data streams (Tress), the time taken to transmit the SOAP 
response back to the client (Trest),  the time taken to de-
serialize the response at the client (Tresd), the time taken by 
the client to decrypt the response message (Tresdc), and lastly 
the time taken by the client to process the response (Tcp). 
The invocation process is shown in Figure 6 and the total 
time taken for the mobile web service invocation is given in 
the following equation 1.  
Tmwsp = Tcc + Treqec + Treqs + Treqt + Treqd + Treqdc + Tprocess + Tresec 
+ T + + T + T + T - (1)
  The exact estimation  and Trest time is not 
The performance of the Mobile 
Th parame ers of 
ere extra delay and variation in stability of the Mobile 
thm. To 
sponse message was 2 KB. The total cycle for highly 
ecured communication, AES-256 bit ciphered, cost around 
3 sec with RSAwithSHA1 signature and ~5.5 sec for 
SAwithSHA1 signature.  
rom the performance model, we can derive the mobile WS 
essage security effort (Tmwsse) as follows: 
mwsse ~= Treqec + Treqdc + Tresec + Tresdc       - (2) 
he extra load to the message size caused by the added 
ecurity information and the extra delay thus obtained are 
ot of the main concern as this all adds to the transmission 
elay. With the advent of the interim-generation 
ologies like GPRS [29] and EDGE [30], and third-
gen ta 
tra in 
the order of few h s. Most recently 
, are reasonable. The following 
ms for an entire 
onse web le. 
isioning is to use AES 
 ress  Trest  resd  resdc  cp         
 
of the Treqt
possible as the process needs the synchronization of time 
stamps of both Mobile Host and client. Moreover these 
transmission times were observed during our previous 
analysis [28]. Those results showed 90% of total invocation 
cycle is transmission time. So to analyze the minute extra 
delays due to security load, the whole invocation cycle is 
observed with both the invocation and processing of the WS 
request at the Mobile Host itself, thus eliminating the 
transmission aspects.  
5.4 Evaluation Model 
The main idea of our study was to realize the WS-Security 
standards for the mobile web service provisioning. For 
achieving this, different encryption algorithms, signer 
algorithms and authentication principles were analyzed in 
the Mobile Host domain. 
Host was observed during the feasibility analysis, for 
reasonable quality of service. e t interest 
w
Host with the introduction of the security overhead. The 
implemented case-by-case solutions were evaluated 
recursively. Some of the results are discussed here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7   Timestamps of various phases of a message-level 
secured web service cycle 
Figure 7 depicts times taken for various phases of a message 
level secured web service request/response cycle. The 
original message was ciphered with AES-256 algorithm and 
its key is exchanged with RSA-1024 PKI algori
summarize further, the request message was 1 KB and 
re
s
~
D
F
m
T
T
s
n
d
techn
eration technologies like UMTS [31], still higher da
nsmission rates are achieved in the wireless domain, 
undreds of Kbs to 2 Mb
with the advent of 4G technologies and their deployment in 
south Asian countries suggests that mobile data 
transmissions of the rate of few GB is also possible [32]. 
These developments should drastically reduce the 
transmission delays and thus make the Mobile Host soon 
realizable in commercial environments also.  
  Based on this, we can say that the additional efforts as 
shown in figure 7, in achieving the highest possible secured 
web service communication
feasibility report further shows the message-level security 
analysis against various symmetric algorith
request-resp  service cyc
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8   Comparison of timestamps with various symmetric key 
algorithms 
The analysis shown in Figure 8 emphasizes that not much 
effort difference exists on security front, out of mandatory 
standards. We can conclude that the best way of securing 
messages in mobile web service prov
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symmetric encryption with 256 bit key, RSA 1024 bit key 
exchange mechanism and RSAwithSHA1 signature. 
. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 6
This paper mainly discussed and analyzed the security 
sues of mobile web services. First we have introduced 
obile web service provisioning and later discussed its 
roblems and aspects with security and tried to give the best 
ossible message-level security scenario for mobile web 
rvices. Our future research in this domain includes 
roviding proper end-point security for the Mobile Host 
sing Single-sign-on with SAML and LA standards. We 
Mo  
applications. 
is
m
p
p
se
p
u
also want to have a detailed performance analysis of the 
bile Host with full security features through real-time
  Based on our till-date realization on security awareness, 
we conclude that secure web service provisioning in mobile 
networks is a great challenge. And as the mechanisms 
developed for traditional networks are not always 
appropriate for the mobile environment, this area still holds 
ample room for further research.  
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